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The growing interest in the use of behavioral insights in the study of public 
administration and policy is contributing to the emergence of behavioral public 
administration (James et al., 2017). This subfield focuses on the “analysis of public 
administration from the micro-level perspective of individual behavior” 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017, p. 45). For some scholars, this approach offers 
interesting opportunities to further the study of perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors 
of citizens, public sector staff, or public managers (Tummers, et al., 2016). The 
combination of behavioral theory and experimental approaches can improve the 
standing of the field of public administration as a design science which informs 
policy and practice (James, Jilke and Van Ryzin, 2017).  
 
The use of behavioral insights has also been gaining momentum in the public 
policy field, particularly as literature on what has come to be known as “nudging” 
continues expanding and the application of non-regulatory and regulatory policy 
approaches (Oliver, 2013) has gained traction (Halpern and Sanders, 2016), for 
example in environmental policy (Byerly et al., 2018; Moseley and Stoker, 2013; 
Alpizar et al., 2020).  
 
The foundations of this line of work build upon the seminal work by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), the extensive work by Thaler (1991), as well as an influential 
book by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Behavioral public policy, however, is broader 
than the nudging literature, and focuses on policy interventions that draw direct 




inspiration and design from behavioral research and the psychology of influence 
(Galizzi, 2014, de Jonge et al., 2018). Recent research on how public policies can 
give rise to changes in citizens’ behaviors recognizes a wide range of policy 
instruments through which behavioral change can be affected (Tummers, 2019).  
 
The behavioral approach has also permeated economics and public economics. 
Behavioral economics and behavioral public economics recognize deviations from 
the assumptions that underpin the standard neoclassical approach offer a “starting 
point for a more realistic view on how individuals make choices” (Alm and 
Sheffrin, 2016, p. 6). Behavioral economics and behavioral public economics have 
also included a move to integrate experimental research both in the laboratory and 
in the field. 
 
In light of these developments, and the evident interest in the contribution of 
disciplines such as psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, or behavioral 
economics, to public administration and public policy, it is inevitable to ask what 
this entails for public finance and budgeting.  
  
A good starting point for reflection is the edited book on behavioral public 
finance that McCaffery and Slemrod published in 2006 (McCaffery and Slemrod, 
2006). These scholars define this subfield as an intersection between behavioral 
economics and public finance, arguing that “[t]o the extent that behavioral 
economics rests on empirically verifiable (and verified) understandings about how 
real people think, choose, decide, and act in real life settings, public finance models 
that aim for real-world relevance ought to take behavioral insights into account” (p. 
4).  
 
We have reached the point where public finance and budgeting scholars should 
acknowledge this key point, as many of the empirical work conducted in our field 
for decades have taken mechanistically rational models of decision-making as a 
given. But as mounting evidence has shown, individuals are emotional actors whose 
decisions can be influenced by contextual cues, social norms, or mental models 
(World Bank, 2015). People are also bounded in their ability to consistently 
consider and respond to all of the features of complex choices. Issues such as mental 
accounting, which allows people to economize on time and thinking costs, and to 
deal with self-control problems (Thaler, 1999), certainty effects, where people have 
a tendency to attribute more weight to certain outcomes than to probable outcomes 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), or choice deferral, the tendency to be put off from 
making choices when additional alternatives are added to the choice set (Tversky 
and Shafir, 1992), can induce decision-making processes that deviate from the 
theoretical expectations of models based on rationality (Congdon, Kling and 




Mullainathan, 2011). Given these issues and departures from mechanistically 
rational models that have tended to underpin understanding of decision making in 
the public finance and budgeting realm, the question posed by McCaffrey and 
Slemrod (2006) remains pertinent and relevant for discourse in our field: What 
implications do citizen heuristics and biases have for important public finance (and 
budgeting) questions? Furthermore, given the nascency of behavioral thinking in 
public finance and budgeting, we extend this question to ask more broadly: What 
implications does a focus on individuals - citizens, taxpayers, public managers, and 
others - have for answering questions central to our field?  
  
The aim of this symposium is to encourage reflection on the extent to which the 
use of behavioral insights can help address the questions and puzzles with which 
public finance and budgeting scholars have been grappling with. From the start of 
research into public budgeting in the early 20th century, there has been an implicit 
behavioral focus. Consider the early work of Willoughby on a national budget 
system. He wrote, “It is hardly necessary to point out that the popular will cannot 
be intelligently formulated nor expressed unless the public has adequate means for 
knowing currently how governmental affairs have been conducted in the past, what 
are present conditions, and what program for work in the future is under 
consideration.” (Willoughby, 1918, p. 57 [emphasis added]). Notice how he frames 
the problem as the formulation and expression of the popular will. Therefore, the 
budget is not merely a technical document, but a means of communication with the 
public in an attempt to inform changes in understanding of the budget situation and 
to influence the popular will.  
 
Public administration research, and by extension public finance and budgeting 
research, is deliberately intended to develop innovations in management and policy 
that enhance the efficient, effective, and equitable provision of public goods and 
services. To us, this implies a role for research on behavioral public administration, 
public finance, and public budgeting. Understanding how individuals process 
information, make decisions, form preferences, and take actions should inevitably 
lead to better governance. To take only one example, researchers for years have 
sought to understand who responds favorably to referendum questions on taxation, 
spending, municipal debt, and other fiscal policy related issues. However, only 
recently have researchers broken from traditional institutional/demographic/socio-
economic studies to ones based on the information that voters receive related to the 
referenda issue (see for example, Brunner, Robbins, and Simonsen (2018); 
O’Connell & Yusuf (2011)). Approaches like this can help further the study of the 
role of information, not only as a signaling mechanism, but as an element whose 
effectiveness depends upon the ways in which individuals receive and process such 
information.  





The use of behavioral insights to inform scholarly discussions in our discipline 
puts the individual back at the center stage of scholarly debates. This, as we see it, 
opens up a range of possibilities for the advancement of knowledge about public 
finance and budgeting, as it can supplement the contributions of scholars interested 
in empirical studies relying on aggregated data by providing more nuanced 
understanding of phenomenon at the micro level.  
 
The increased interest in the use of behavioral sciences entails that we envision 
the individual as the primary unit of analysis: the individual as a voter, as a 
taxpayer, or as a public manager. And as we do this, it will also be necessary to 
rethink some of the foundational assumptions about the individual and individual 
decision making that the public finance and budgeting literature has made. For 
example, the behavioral lens prompts us to consider whether mechanistic 
rationality should still be the norm when explaining individual decision-making. 
 
The goal of this symposium issue of Public Finance and Management is then 
to open up and encourage a conversation about relevant puzzles driving scholarly 
work in public finance and budgeting, and the extent to which the use of behavioral 
theories, approaches, and methodologies can contribute to advancing knowledge in 
our field. The editorial team for this symposium selected six articles to attain this 
goal. Through these articles, we also seek to illustrate the possibilities for answering 
public finance and budgeting questions using a behavioral lens and beyond.  
 
2. REVIEW ARTICLE AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS  
 
The symposium starts with a useful review of the literature on what Mohr and 
Kearney refer to as Behavioral-Experimental Public Budgeting and Financial 
Management. This article is a good reference point to trace the evolution of this 
particular area of study and situate recent efforts to address queries using behavioral 
and experimental approaches. The authors elaborate two arguments throughout 
their review. The first claim is that contrary to what some may expect, much of the 
foundational budgeting research can be considered behavioral. The second claim is 
that several areas within public budgeting research have been conducting 
experiments for a long time. They pose the following questions: (1) What areas of 
public budgeting and financial management have been using experimental designs? 
(2) What literature in other fields of study can be related to public budgeting and 
financial management research? and (3) What can one learn from such approaches 
that may help guide the still nascent behavioral-experimental public budgeting and 
financial management field?  
 




They establish that Herbert Simon’s (1947) book on administrative behavior is 
a seminal piece in the development of this area of study. But as Mohr and Kearney 
correctly point out, the contributions of Nobel laureates Daniel Kahneman, Amos 
Tversky, and Richard Thaler have encouraged a renewed interest in behavioral and 
experimental research.  
 
Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (1979) has been particularly 
influential in the development of behavioral public finance, for reasons that are 
explained in the article by Hlouskova and Tsigaris. A central tenet in behavioral 
public finance is taxpayers’ behavior, which traditionally, has been modeled based 
on an expected utility framework that assumes, among other things, that individuals 
are rational and risk averse. Prospect Theory questions the pertinence of such 
assumptions. Hlouskova and Tsigaris contribute to the symposium with a 
theoretical article assessing how capital income taxation influences certain types of 
investors (e.g., loss averse ones), in situations where full loss offset provisions exist 
(i.e., when investors reduce their tax obligations by writing off operating losses 
against past or future profits).  They test their results against the effects predicted 
with the expected utility framework and find that expected utility is not a good 
explanation of investor behavior, as they establish reference levels with respect to 
their endowment income - a core element of Prospect Theory. 
Fennimore and McCue push our thinking further beyond behavioral public 
finance and the application of psychological theories and experimental methods 
research towards a neuroscientific approach to understand how decisions within the 
public budgeting and financial management realm are made physiologically. Using 
the example of Prospect Theory, they note that its application within a behavioral 
public finance framework provides a descriptive understanding of human 
motivation underpinning decisions but has limited utility for explaining why and 
how decisions are made. To extend our knowledge, they argue that neuroscientific 
methods and a neuro-finance lens can help us understand how brain functioning 
explains why we make certain decisions. Quoting Desmoulins-Lebeault et al., the 
authors argue that this approach can help “reconcile classic and behavioral finance 
by showing that emotions are critical to rational decision-making, in spite of also 
being part of the origin of biases” (2018, p. 93). Fennimore and McCue also make 
an important connection between the behavioral and neuroscientific approaches to 
public finance research.  
Specifically, they apply a neuroscientific perspective to understand how public 
financial managers approach risk. They propose and describe a risk-tolerance 
model that connects risk tolerance levels and approaches to risk of emotional states, 
reinforcers that activate or inhibit future behaviors, and organizational or 
employment culture. They use this model to explain how some financial managers 




are neurobiologically inclined to be risk-averse because of motivations rooted in 
the fear of disrupting the status quo or avoiding punishment. In contrast, other 
public financial managers are neurobiologically inclined towards risk-seeking 
behaviors, motivated by hope for rewards or despite frustrations of not being 
rewarded. This model also recognizes that risk taking behavior is mediated by 
social and organizational influences and is neurobiologically motivated by learned 
behaviors. Risk-taking behavior is learned based on cultural antecedents and 
reinforced by the organizational environment, and over time government financial 
managers’ risk tolerance becomes ‘hardwired’ neurologically.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES AND APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL 
APPROACHES 
 
The symposium then considers three empirical papers that demonstrate the 
application of behavioral approaches to fiscal policy and financial management 
issues. The first paper, by Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger, examines the interaction 
between tax salience and public program framing. They analyze responses to the 
New York state’s School Tax Relief (STAR) program on the demand for school 
quality, taking advantage of differences in administration of the STAR program 
during different periods. Using models that capture expenditure-based and 
performance-based demand as well as cost-efficiency, they find that framing the 
program in terms of income leads to increased demand for quality. Further, they 
find that increased salience (measured by increasing dollar amounts of benefits 
from the program) along with framing (in terms of income) had a greater impact on 
school demand versus framing alone. This speaks to how framing and salience can 
work together to change the demand for school quality. Finally, Nguyen-Hoang and 
Yinger examine the impact of the federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act on the 
demand for expenditures on quality education in the reading and math areas 
compared to other unspecified performance areas. They find (1) an increase in the 
price elasticity of demand for reading and math, (2) a decrease in the price elasticity 
for other performance areas, and (3) no income effects. This suggests that framing 
was the important factor in driving increased demand for school quality in the wake 
of NCLB. 
 
In the Prospect Theory framework, there are two stages of decision making, 
editing information and evaluation of the edited information. Framing effects occur 
in the editing phase of decision making. Status quo effects are one particular type 
of editing, and results in status quo bias. This is where individuals tend to put too 
much weight on past choices, absent specific evidence that they can improve their 
situation by making new choices. Dzigbede examines this effect in municipal bond 




underwriting choices. Using a model of optimal underwriter choice, he finds that 
issuers repeat their issuer choice more often than can be expected from rational 
assessment of costs and benefits of issuance. Using simulation methods, he then 
calculates the cost of this bias for issuers. The cost of this bias is rather substantial, 
suggesting that there is room for Pareto improving “nudges” to help issuers make 
better decisions. 
 
In the final paper in the symposium, Jones, Greer, and Reitano analyze the 
presence of anchoring bias (another editing bias in the Tversky and Kahneman 
theory) when school district performance ratings are published. Using data on 
school bond referenda in Texas, they find that voters do anchor their information 
on past performance ratings published by the Texas Education Agency, unless that 
rating is downgraded. Their results are robust to selection bias induced by non-
random choices of school districts to issue debt. These results are important not 
only for understanding the role of performance information on voter perception but 




As we developed the call for papers for this Public Finance and Management 
symposium issue, our hope was that we would be able to compile a series of articles 
that would highlight the promise of the behavioral approach to public finance and 
budgeting research and encourage consideration of how the application of 
behavioral theories and methodologies can further advance knowledge in our field. 
Through a combination of a review article, two articles that offer theoretical 
framing for understanding individual decision making as investors/taxpayers and 
public financial managers, and three articles that empirically examine how biases 
influence individuals’ perceptions and actions, we feel that we have succeeded in 
doing so. The ultimate goal of this symposium is to encourage reflection on and 
conversation about the use of behavioral public finance and budgeting to answer 
questions and puzzles we continue to grapple with in our field.  Putting the 
individual back at the center of our study of public finance and budgeting issues, 
opens up a range of interesting questions and methodologies for understanding 
micro-level phenomenon that revolve around the individual as a voter, a resident, 
an investor, a recipient of services, a taxpayer, or as a public manager. 
 
We invite readers to reflect on each of the topics included in this symposium 
and think about ways to expand on a promising subfield of public administration. 
The opportunities to develop further understanding of many of the questions that 
remain unanswered in public finance and budgeting calls for research approaches 
that are willing to address issues with new analytical lenses. We are confident that 




the use of behavior-informed approaches is promising and encourage scholars to 
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